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This paper considers the social welfare consequences of currency substitution and
determines under which circumstances it is efficient from a social welfare perspective to
prohibit currency substitution in a small open economy by means of imposing currency
controls and under which circumstances it is inefficient to impose such controls. An
empirical application of the analytical results is considered with respect to eurrency
substitution in Poland. In January 1990, Polish authorities decided to remove the strict
foreign exchange controls. A strong increase in currency substitution took place.
Empirical evidence is found for a structural break in Polish money demand around the
rcmoval of ~hc comrols, ~,ivinz par~ial cmpirical support for thc analytical results. Thc
removal of foreign exchange controls was a crucial element in the reform program that
aimed at transforming Poland from a communist into a democratic market-oriented
society. Because of the rashness and peivasiveness of the reform implementation, this
reform is often referred to as the 'Polish Big Bang'. The removal of foreign exchange
controls was also part of an extensive disinflation program that was launched in January
1990 that aimed at stopping the rampant hyperintlation that developed in the second half
of 1989, as a consequence of the removal of former price ceilings in a shortage economy
with monetary overhang and a system of general wage- and income indexation. The
Polish experience is likely to be instructive for other developing countries that have to
decide whether or not to remove currency controls.
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t~ 1. Introductioiz.
[n January 1990 Polish monetary authorities decided to restore convertibility with the US
~ and the European currencies as part of the entire reform program towards a democratic
market-oriented economy. This decision was motivated by both structural considerations -
the removal of currency controls is likely to encourage foreign trade and the reform
process towards a market-oriented economy- and short-term inflation stabilization conside-
rations. The stabilization program was carried out under supervision of the IMF. Figure 1
displays the Polish annualized rate of inflation and the (natural logarithm) of real money
balances:
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Figure 1. Inflation and velocity Poland.
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The graph reveals the sharp increase in inflation and velocity at the end of 1989. After
implementation oF the stabilization program intlation started to decrease throughout 1990
and 1991. The setup and ultimate results of the Polish stabilization program of 1990 are
well documented, e.g. in Kolodko ~ 1991 ~ and therefore we concentrate on one monetary
aspect : the removal of currency controls and the consequences of an increase in currency
substitution that is likely to have accompanied the program.
Currency substitution entails a partial replacement of the amount of domestic money in
2circulation in the domestic economy by tbreign money, both for transaction purposes and
as a storc of valuc. C'urrency suhslitution :~rises from currency - or money demand that is
sensitivc to hoth domcstic and foreign influcnces, in particularly it is likely to depend
strongly on homc and foreign interest ratcs. If real interest rates are assumed to be small
and constant, the oppor[unity costs of holding domestic and foreign money depend almost
entirely on the domestic and foreign rate of intlation. Currency substitution in the domes-
tic country is likely to increase with a higher domestic interest rate (viz. inflation rate)
and a lower foreign interest rate (viz. intlation rate). This "inflation driven" currency
substitution stands central in uur analysis of the Polish experience. The part of currency
substitution that was driven by increases in foreign trade and other possible factors
encounters less attention : it comes in as a constant.
The presence of currency substitution of a significant degree is likely to influence
monetary dynamics and public finance in a small open economy. Currency substitution
influences puhlic finance since it enables the domestic agents to circumvent the inflation
[ax imposed hy thc domestic ;tiovernme:nt on holders of domestic money. When domestic
money is hetd hy foreign agents, an additional foreign source of seignorage revenues is
available. Via their influence on seignorage revenues, currency substitution and currency
controls affect the whole public finance. Moreover, currency substitution will foster
inflationary discipline, which could provide an incentive for macroeconomic policymakers
to avoid excessively intlationary policies, in this manner contributing to a higher level of
social welt~are. These effects of currency suhstitution on puhlic finance, and by that on
social welfare, have to he considered by monetary policymakers if they set the interest
rate such as to maximize domestic social welfare.
In this paper the puhlic finance -, and conseyuently the social welfare consequences of
currency suhstitution and of currency controls that seek to discourage currency substitu-
tion, stand centraL In the model that is developed it is possible to determine when it is
oplim,il and whrn il is nul ohlinial Irum a ti~icial wclfarc pcrspcctivc lo impusc a currcncy
control in a small open economy with currency substitution.
In our analysis we assume that the government sets the domestic interest rate such as to
3maximize domestic social welfare. y'he conseyuences of currency substitution -inflationary
discipline and the impact on domestic seignorage revenues- are balanced at the margin if
interest rates I inllation rates are set optimally. Then we proceed by introducing the possi-
bility that authorities can choose to implement a currency control that effectively prevents
domestic residents to hold foreign money. It is shown when a decision to implement or
remove a currency control is eftïcient from a welfare economic perspective. Currency
controls entail social welfare costs since they prevent domestic agents to maintain an
oplinial p~~rlfulio ~~f d~~nirstic ;inil furri~n m~rnry and do not providc Ihc intlationary
discipline of currency substitution. Currency controls, on the other hand prevent a leakage
of seignorage revenues to the foreign authorities when domestic agents substitute away
from domestic to tbreign money. A decision to impose or remove a currency control, if
to be cl~ficient, takes accounl i~f these clfects in a balanced manner.
While currency substitution in its most strict definition refers [o the circulation of foreign
currency or hase money in the home country, often a more broad perspective is associated
with wrrency substitution by including foreign currency denoted sight- and time
deposits. The use of such an extended money definition is more useful in countries with
well developed monetary and financial systems. Applying broader money definitions,
implies that currency substitution becomes closely related to capital mobility and capital
tlight.
Canzoneri 8c Diba [1992~ compare the optirnal rates of inflation when monetary autho-
rities ina 2-country game play seignorage maximization games with the optimal rate of
inflation when countries play welfare maximization games. Optimal inflation rates in both
inirnc~ary p~~licy l~;imrti cri~ic;illy ilr~icnil un Ihc ilc}~,rce of currcncy substitution trnd in
wclfarc maximization games uptinntl intlation rates also depend on the marginal distortion
of ordinary taxation. A higher degree of currency substitution lowers the optimal rate of
inflation in both games as expected, while a higher marginal distortion from ordinary
taxation incrcascs the optimal rate ol' inflation ín the welfare maximization game. This
paper extends the work of Canzoneri 8r Diba by considering the welfare consequences of
introducing currency controls by the monetary authorities in an attempt to discourage
currency substitution. Because of complexity the analysis is not cast into a 2-country
4game as in the Canzoneri 8c Diba article hut in a small country framework.
The structure of this paper is as follows : section 2 introduces a macroeconomic model in
which currency substitution is present. Social welfare is determined in the presence of
currency substitution when monetary authorities set the interest rate such as to maximize
domeslic social wclfare. In sectiun 3 the wcll~are conseyuences of introducing currency
controls are derived. Section 4 applies the results from theory to the case of Poland.
Section 5 concludes.
~ 2. Mudelling c~urrency suhstitutinn.
As mentioned in the introduction, cun~ency substitution extends traditional money demand
modelling by allowing for the possibility that domestic agents hold both domestic and
foreign money. Real macroeconomic money demand for domestic and foreign money
balances can either be postulated or derived from an underlying micro-economic
maximization problem. While the former approach has the advantage of simplicity, the
latter approach is more attractive from a theoretical point of view.
An often encountered manner to derive such a micro-founded macroeconomic money de-
mand function is the money-in-the-utility funetion (MIUF) approach : it assumes that
money in itself is valued because of the direct utility it produces. The cash-in-advance
approach (CIA) is anothcr approach : it takcs transaction technology as a starting point
and derives from it real money demand. The money-ín-the-utility function approach
stresses the importance of money as a store of value and as a speculative asset while the
cash-in-advance approach concentrates on the transaction part of real money demand. The
cash-in-advance approach can he shown to he a specific case of the money-in-the-utility
function approach, namely in which real money and real consumption complementary
goods in the utility function, and money demand has unitary income elasticity2.
' Vègh ( 1989~ analyses thc effects of currency substitution when money demand is
hascd on cash-in-advancc constraints.
5Cunsidrr U,c fullowin,ti small opcn ccunumy in which we analyse currcncy suhstitution
and currency controls. Since the store of value function of money stands central in our
analysis ol cw-rency suhstitutiun we chose tu dcrive money detnand according lo the
money-in-the-utility function approach. The representative domestic agent is assumed to
maximize a utility function that has as its arguments real consumption and the amount of
rcal money halanccs:
maX~f m n U~ - J{U(C~) t V(m~,n~;a)).e
-a.`
C~t U~,Vm,V~1O U~~~Vmm,V~ SO (1)
t~
s.t. w-r~.w~ }y~-t~-c~-i~.mi-
t t.f w~ - m~ n~ r
lim f~.e -b ` - 0 m~,n~ ~ 0
r
(2)
All variables are in logarithms. c, denotes real consumption of the domestic agent, y~ is
real income, which is assumed to be given and constant in the short run, T, are lump-sum
taxes that are imposed by the fiscal authorities. m, are domestic agents' real balances of
domestic money, defincd as numinal nwncy hal:uices detlated by the domestic price level.
n, are the real balances of foreign money. The real value of foreign money is equal to
their nominal value (in f-oreign currency) detlated hy the foreign price level. f, represent
real net foreign asset holdings of domestic residents : like real foreign money balances
they are defined as the nominal value (in foreign currency) detlated by the foreign price
IeveL It follows that the 'foreign' part of real wealth, n, -~ f, , is not eroded by domestic
inlfation while the 'domestic' part , m„ is.
Both monies are non-interest bearing. Risk free bonds denominated in domestic and
f~,rcit,n currcncy :,rc Ihr unly availahl~ Iinancial asscls :uul Ihcir nominal rcturns :,rc
denoted as i, and i,`, respectively.The rate of time preference is given by S. Real wealth,
w„ consists of domestic money, foreign money and net foreign assets and is subject to a
no-Ponzi condition that prevents individuals -and the aggregate of domestic agents when
~,we aggregate- from a scheme of continuously rolling over an ever increasing amount of
net foreign assets - or foreign deht. r, is the real rate of interest. a is a parameter
associated with currency suhstitution : in the model we choose a to be equal to minus the
rcciprocal uf thc currcncy suhstitution clasticity. 'fhis clasticity mcasures thc scnsitivity uf
the ratio of buth monies M, I N, that agents hold with respect to changes in the interest
rate differential (i, - i,').'
The parameter a summarizes the s[ructural and institu[ional characteristics of the moneta-
ry system of the small open country, under study. Guidotti (1993) analyses the conse-
quences of financial innovations that facilitate currency substitution in the domestic
country, inducing a decrease of a. When considering the welfare consequences of curren-
cy substitution and currency controls later on, it is shown how social welfare critically
depends on the level of a. In this respect changes over time of Q, are clearly very
interesting to consider. Financial innovations enable the representative agent to economise
on real money balances, which make him better off, as is clear when considering eq.(1).
However a'secondary' effect is present, as indicated by de Grégorio [1991] : a decrease
in a induces a decrease in holdings oF rcal domestic money and therefore a decrease in
real seignorage revenues that has to be compensated by a rise in ordinary taxes, r„ which
makes the agent worse off. The exact magnitudes of both effects determine whether the
economy is better off from a financial innovation or not.
The holdings of foreign money by domestic residents monies, n, , and the holdings of
domestic money by foreign residents -which will be denoted by m,' - reflect the presence
of currency substitution between domestic and foreign money, and are a source of exter-
nalities between the small country and the rest-of-the-world.
' The currency suhstitu[ion elasticity is defined as :
d(m~ - n~) 1
a(i~ - i~~) a
I:mpirical cslinrUcs uf thc currcncy suhslituliun clasticily usually yicld yuiet high valucs
for the currency suhstitution elasticities in developing high intlation countries, in the
range of 1.5 to 6. The elasticity is much less for low inflation countries, in the range 0 to
1. Iso-elasticity oi~ monetary utility v(m„ n, ; Q) in eq.(1) seems dubious in this light.
~Solving the maximization problems of the representative agent yields implicit demand
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in which )` i.ti Ihc cu tilalc varialil~~ astiucialal wilh rcal cunsuntpliun. 'I'Itc rcal ccunonty is
assumed to be in equilibrium over time': the real rate of interest is assumed to be equal to
the rate of time preference and real consumption and real money balances enter the utility
function in a separable fashion:
r~ - S Ht U~„~ - U~R - 0 (9)
Given the assumptions in eq. (9) and the Fisher-hypothesis, inflation rates change
proportional to nominal interest rates:
(10)
Domestic and forcign inflation rates, ~r, and ~r,", are assumed to be linked by the assump-
tion of relative purchasing power parity:
in which é is the expected rate of depreciation of the home currency, which is equal to
the actual rate of depreciation if we perfect foresight for granted. When the real interest
" With regard to Poland this assumption seems to be exceptionally far from reality.
Nevertheless we pursue this line as our analysis solely concerns itself with possible
welfare effects of currency controls and currency substitution. The simple model that can
derived in this manner seems well-suited to deal with [hese welfare considerations.
Rrate and the foreign rate of int7ation are constant, equivalence between setting the interest
rate, the rate of inflation and the rate of depreciation by the monetary authorities will
hold'. "I'hc dcsign uf uplimal inlcrest ratc targcting is thcn equivalent to the choice of
optimal inflation and op[imal exchange rate policies.
Public finance is subject to the usual dynamic government budget constraint:
~ g~ - t, - s~ - i~ . m~ - i~.(m~ t m~ ) (12)
in which g, are real government expenditures T, are lump-sum taxes, s, are real seignorage
revenues accruing to the monetary authorities because of their monopoly in creating
domestic (hase) money and the ahility to set the domestic interest rateh. m,` is the supply
by thc niunclary aulhorilics ul rcal dunicslic iuuncy.
The fiscal deficit that a government runs -the LHS of eqs.(12)- is financed by seignorage
revenues. The puhlic finance view of inflation treats real seignorage revenues as being
part of a wider tax system : by setting the nominal domestic interest rate holders of
5 Constant real interest and real exchange rates, admittedly, are not an accurate
description of macro-economic reality in the short-run, especially not in a country like
Poland. Varying real interest and exchange rates are considered as important adjustment
devices in the real economy in the short-run. Since our analysis comes down to a steady-
state comparison of social wclfare in different monetary policy regimes, our simplificati-
ons may nul hc lhal inapproprialc.
`' Real seignorage revenues in ey.(12) are defined according to the 'opportunity cost'
approach. The 'cash-ffow' approach distinguishes two sources of seignorage : a) passive
seignorage, which results from trend growth of real money balances, and b) active
seignorage, ~r,.m,`, which results from the inflation tax on money:
5 S s s~-m tn~.m~ - p.m~
in which ~ is the growth rate of nominal money balances. The two approaches are similar
but not equal in generaL In case the second approach would have been taken, ~ instead of
i, would have been our monetary instrument.
~~domestic money are implicitly taxed'. The government budget constraint determines that
in a situation of constant real government expenditures, real seignorage revenues in
excess of these expenditures are proportionally rebated to the domestic agents.
The intlation tax is distortionary in that a higher rate of domestic inflation induces agents
to hold fewer domestic balances and to suhstitute away into foreign balances : according
to eq.(6), only when the domestic nominal interest rate is equal to zero -or equivalently
when the domestic rate of int7ation is equal to minus the real rate of interest rate~rate of
time preference- households' drmand for domestic money will be satiated. This situation
is known as thc l~ricdnran rulc of uptinral nronctary policy. If ordinary taxes are distortio-
nary, the Friedman rulc is not optimal : efficient taxation reyuires setting positive nominal
interest rates.
Currency substitution, via its intluence on the intlation tax, introduces a source of
externalities : seignorage revenues that domestic agents transfer to the foreign monetary
authorities through currency substitution are proportionally rebated to foreign agents by
the foreign monetary authorities, whereas the intlation tax on foreign holders of domestic
muncy iti prupurli~mally rch,i~cd lo ilonreslic afcnts, together with the intlation tax levied
on domestic holders of domestic money. Because of the fact that part of the intlation tax
on domestic money can be shifted upon the shoulders of foreign agents, a rate of inflation
higher than the Friedman rule will appear to be optimal, even when ordinary taxes are
non-distorlionary. Money market market equilihrium is defined as:
' Efficient taxation entails the minimization of the discounted social costs of
financing a given amount of public expenditures. Efficient taxation requires (a) the
eyualization of the marginal exccss hw-den of all tbrms of taxation in one period (a static
optimality condition) ,(b) the eyualization of marginal costs of ordinary taxation over
different periods, a principle that is known as Barro's tax smoothing hypothesis, and (c)
the equalization over time of marginal social costs of inflation taxation. (b) and (c) are
dynamic optimality conditions. Empirical testing of the implications of optimal taxation
principles would amount to testing whether inflation and ordinary tax rates are cointe-
grated (static optimality condition) and whether inflation and ordinary tax rates are
random walks (dynamic optimality conditiuns). The presence of cointegration indicates
that inllation - and ordinary tax rates are scl el'ficiently intrutemporally, while evidence of
random walks in intlation - and ordinary tax rates, presents evidence for tax-smoothing,
i.e. intertemporally optimal taxation.
iom~ t m~~ - ms (13)
"I'hc halance of payments dcfinition, acairding tu which the current accuunt is eyual to
minus the capital account, is detined as":
f t ri - - r~.f t y~ - c~ - g~ (14)
C'onsidcr thc following ulilily funclion in cq.(I):
U~-f{ct-0.5(y-m~tw-n~)`-O.Sa~(Y-m~)`t(W-n~)2]}.e-a.tdt Y~W~Q~O (15)
~o
in which ti and w are constants that retlect optimal holdings of domestic and foreign
money respectively. a is a parameter that weights both parts of the RHS of eq.(15) and is
equal to minus the reciprocal of the interest rate differential elasticity of the relative
amount of real domestic money balances of domestic agents, (m,-n,), the currency
substitution elasticity, for short. When positive, both monies are substitutes of eachother,
whcn nc}~alivr hnlh iu~~nics :n~c c~implrinrnl.ti. Iln - 0 and w- 0 rcpresents Ihc casc
when no currency substitution occurs (n,- 0) : in the large traditional literature on all
sorts of aspects concerning monetary policy this is implicitly assumed. Allowing for
currency substitution however certainly would change or modify most results from this
literature. (~ptiinal rcal balances of domestic and foreign moncy result when the marginal
utility of m, and n, are equal to ihe domestic and foreign nominal interest rate. These 2
first-order-conditions can be solved to give m, and n~ as a function of domestic and foreign
interest rates :
" Implicitly, it is assumed that the authorities do not hold any foreign money in the
form of foreign exchange reserves : they are assumed not to practice any active form of
exchange rate managemcnt. Any from of active exchange rate management -be it a fixed
exchange rate system, a target zone or a crawling peg could be readily inserted in our
model. The present analysis concentrates on a different form of monetary intervention in
the economy.
ii(o t 1) 1 m~ - y a(a }2) i~ t 6(a }2) i~`
1 (a}1) f n~ - w a(a}2).i, - a(Q}2).i~
(16)
(17)
A rise of [he domestic nominal interest rate induces a decrease in the demand for
domestic money and an increase in the demand for foreign money, while a rise in the
foreign interest rate has the opposite effects. -(at1)~(a(Qf2)) is equal to the convential
interest elasticity of real money demand. Holdings of both monies are nonnegative as long
as we restrict the domestic nominal interest rate to be set within a certain range :
t
(Cl) In~?~ " i~ ~ a(a ).Y t 1.[r
atl atl
(b) n~~p a i~ ~ -a(af2).wf(afl).i~.
(18)
If the domestic interest rate exceeds the upper limit of (a) a hyperinflation results :
don~cslic af;cnls scck lu rcducc lhcir holdin~s uf dontcslic rcal nwncy lu zcrci'. lf thc
domestic interest rate is lower than the lower limit of (b) domestic agents actually would
prefer to have a negative amount of foreign currency which is not possible. In the
remainder ~~f the analysis, it is assumed that the inequalities are not violated, to ensure
nonnegativity uf m, and n,. I~ureign demand for domes[ic money is assumed to be
constant:
m,' - a a ? 0 (19)
"I'his assumption makcti it pussihlc lo retilrict contputational complexity in the rcmainder
of the analysis considerably. This simplifying assumption can also be interpreted to
represent a situation in which foreign demand for domestic money is constant and not
sensitive to interest rates : such a situation is present when the Q' in the foreign equivalent
" Unstable hyperintlationary processes, in general, can only be ruled out when money
is essential to agents, i.e. when v(m-0) -- oo. When money is essential lim,,,v~
{m.v,,,'} 1 0, as first shown by Obstfeld 8r. Rogoff [1983]. Essentiality of money is
however not an attractive property. Money in the present model is inessential, as can be
seen hy inspecting v,,,'(O,n,;a) and v„'(m,,0;o).
izof eq.(15) goes to infinity.
The parameters {a,ry,w,a} of the money demand system represent all factors that are not
modelled but do affect demand fur money : these parameters possibly change over time.
An increase in w could represent an increase in currency substitution arising from an
inerease in foreign trade and all other factors : an increase in Poland's w is likely to have
lakcn placc in Ihc pcriucl I~)K}{ I~)91.
The money demand functions eys.(16) and (17) illustrate the well-known property that an
increase in currency substitution possibilities, i.e. a decrease in a, raises the interest rate
sensitivity of demand for domestic money demand. If data on m~ and n, are available,
estimation of a, y and w frum eqs.(16)-(17) is possible using nonlinear regression
tcchniyucs. In thc cmpirical scction lhc lack uf data un m, and n, is partly resolved by
using the fact that eys.(16) and (19) sum up to real money demand M1~P on which data
are available. The virtual absence of a private banking systems makes our analysis quite
applicablc lo thc case uf~ Poland.
Social welfare maxímizing monetary policy.
Optimal munctary pulicy rcquires nwnctary aulhuritics setting the interest rate such as to
maximize national welfare. lnterest rate targeting is achieved by setting of a prime
lending rate, reserve requirements and open market policies. Currency substitution affects
social welfare in twu cuntlicting ways : cw-rency substitution allows domestic agents to
have a higher lifetime utility hy the possibility to hold both monies and substitute between
both monies when relative opportunity costs of holding both monies change. By holding
forcign muncy, dumcstic agcnts arc able tu circumvent to a certain degree the distor-
tiunary effccts uf the dumestic inllatiun tax. Currency suhstitution in this manner affects
the division of seignorage revenues between countries : a higher interest rate differential
induccs a suhtililuliun I~~w;irilti Ihc forci~,ii inuncy and a conscqucnt luss uf drnttcslic
seignorage proceeds (and an increase in foreign seignorage revenues). This is the
important externality that was touched upun before. The maximization of social welfare
requires the balancing both effects in setting the optimal rate of interest. This balancing of
14contlicting effects is also seen in the next section where we consider a situation where
~overnmcnls posscti ,in aelJiti~~nal instrumcnt in imposing currcncy controls that effectively
prevent currency substitution to be feasible.
The present value of domestic social welfare is equal to:
~i~ I(Y~ S~ l~.m~ l~~.n~ t v(m~,n~; a)} . e-a ` dr (20)
~u
Public finance is subject to the intertemporal budget constraint on public finance, which is
found hy integrating ey.(12):
f {g~ - ti~} .e -a.r dt - f {i~.(m~ t m~`) } .e -a.~ dt
~Jo ~o
(21)
according tn which the presen~ value of all future primary fiscal deficits is equal to the
prescnt valuc ul lulurc xcignuraf;c rcvcnucs, which originatc fronr a domestic, m„ and
foreign tax base, m,'. The welfare maximization problem is solved by maximizing eq.(20)
with respect to the domestic numinal interest rate, subject to eq.(21) -the intertemporal
government budget consU'aint-. the money demand functions eqs.(16), (17) and (19) and
monetary utility v(.,.;o) as defined in eq.(15):
max~ f{y~-g~ti~.m~~-i,~.n~ -0.5(Y -m~ fw -n~)2 -O.SQ((Y -m~)z}(w-n~)2)}.e-a.rdt ~
~~
(22)
'I'hc lerm i,.m,'- i,'.n, rcprcunts the scignorage flows in the presence of currency
substitution hetwcen the small country and the rest-of-the-world. Outcomes of the social
welfare problem in eq.(22), the command optimum, and the outcome without an
optimizing social planner, the 'private solution' from the problem as stated in eq.(1), in
generally will differ, as the individual agent is not able to internalize the public finance
conseyuences uf cw-rcncy suhstitution, while a rational monetary policymaker can. The
iaoptimal rate of interest that results is eyual to"':
o(a t2)
(a}I) .a (23)
Currency substitution as parametrized by a and a influences the optimal nominal interest
rate : a lower a, or a higher currency substitution elasticity in the small country drives
down the optimal nominal interest rate, while a higher a increases it. Social welfare in
the small home country can then be calculated by using eq.(23) in eq.(22):
iy~ -~~ - i,.
W} (a f l) ir. z } Q(o } 2).a2 i e-a.r dt
2(a,2) 2(atl)
(24)
Social welfare at time t, if monetary authorities set the interest rate according to eq.(23),
depends on the parameters {i,',W,Q,a} for a given dynamic path of y, and g, which are
independent of monetary conditions in this framework.
~ 3. Social welfare implications of currencv controls.
llntil now il h:~s hccn Íissumcd th,it the monetary authorities did not impose any restriction
on currency substitution. In this section we consider the welfare implications of the
additional possibility of imposing currency controls by the monetary authorities in an
attempt to avoid currency substitution to occur. Since the use of foreign exehange
restrictions is widespread in rcality", it seems interesting to incorporate this possibility
"' "I'his result depends strongly on our assumptiun of non-distortionarity of ordinary
taxes. IF, as in Canzuneri and Diba ~ 1992~ collection costs K(T) are introduced which are a
convex function of the tax rates, K'(.) 1 0 and K"(.) ~ 0, ordinary taxes would no longer
be non-distortionary and tax and intlation rates would have to be set jointly by monetary
;ind I'iscal authuriticti such as tu nrinimizc ovcrall distortions from ordinary and inflation
taxation. In the presence of distortionary ordinary taxation, optimal interest rates are set
higher as cumpared to a situation where no-distorsions are present, proportional to the
marginal cost of ordinary taxation.
" More institutional details on the use of foreign exchange restrictions can be found
in the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
~1990~.
ISinto the framework of optimal monetary policy in the presence of currency substitution :
by comparing of social welfare in the presence of currency controls with social welfare
wilh~~ut currcnry cui~uulti wc c;in clclcnninc in which circumstanccs an optimiiing govcrn-
ment is likely tu impuse such wntrols.
Consider the following definition of a perfect currency control in the home country12:
n~ - 0 b' t (25)
Assume that the use of domestic money by foreign agents is not restricted by either
domestic or foreign monetary authorities. When a currency control is imposed by the
monetary authorities of the small country, the social welfare funetion as defined in
cy.(22) ch;mges uf course:
max~ U~ - f {y~ -g~ t i~.mt' -0.5(Y -m~ t w )z -O.Sa((Y -m,)z t wz ) }. e -a.rdt (26)
~
~~
Also demand for domestic money by domestic agents changes since their money demand
is the result of a dil'I~crcnt, nwrc restrictcd, optimiration program from which results:
1 1
m~ - Y t a}I.w - a}l.i~ (27)
If we compare eq.(27), the 'restricted' demand for domestic money by domestic agents,
wilh the 'unrestricted' demanil fur dumestic agents by domcstic agents, ey.(16), i[ appears
that restricted money demand is higher by an amount of :
uR R 1 1
m~ - m~ --(a } 1) - w - a(a t 2)(a t
f I i' (28)
a(a t2) `
An unanticipated abolitiun of a currency cuntrol at time t induces a structural break in
demand tbr domestic money hy domestic agents -according to the model at least- : the
constant falls, while the sensitivity w.r.t the domestic and foreign interest rate increases.
These are thrce predictions that are more or less conform recurring themes in the
''- In reality, one would nut expect monetary policymakers to be able to that effective
in imposing currency controls. A'leaky' currency control n, - v with v 1 0, could be
introduced instead of ey.(2S).
16currcncy suhstituti~m litrraturc. In our cmpirical analysis of the Polish removal of
exchange restrictiuns in January 1990, such a predicted structural break is also inves-
ligalcd.
Maximization of social welfare in eq.(21) in the presence of currency controls is achieved
when the interest rate is set equal to:
i~ ( a ~ I). a (Zc~)
Also in this situation a domestic interest rate beyond the threshold as defined in ey.(18)
induces zero domestic real money and hyperinFlation. When a currency control is
imposed, optimal interest rates are set higher than when it is decided to refrain from a
contrul, as is clcar whcn suhtracting cq.(29) frum ey.(23):
ln~ - l~~ -- 1 .a S 0
` ` (a t 1)
(30)
in which i,"` refers to the optimal interest rate of eq.(23) when no currency control is
iinpuscd and i~" lu Ihc ~~pliuial intcresl r;rtc uf cy.('y) whcn a currcncy cunlrul was
imposed. The explanation for this difference is the working of currency substitution as a
disinflationary device, which is activated when removing a currency control, when at least
cx is not equal to 0 or a approaches infinity. Substituting eq.(29) back into eq.(26) allows
us to dctennine sucial wclf.u-c when a cun-ency control is imposed and interest rates are
set optimal:
U`~~ - (' {y` -~` ~ ~ (2 a t 1). az - (2o t 1) . wz
J ., 2(o t 1) r~
a.rdt (31)
Now that we have determined social welfare with currency controls when interest rates
are set efficiently from a social welfare perspective, we can determine when it is optimal
to impose a currency control and when not, by comparing eqs.(24), which gives U,"`,
social wclGu-e without currency controls, and (31), which gives U,", social welfare with
currcncy cuntrols:
~7,~~~ ~~~~ a t 1 . ~ (Q~ t Q- 1) z Q~Q t 2) 2 -a ~ U, U, ~{ i,'w ~ o(o ~) i, F 2(oi 1) a t 2(0 ~ I) w I.e ~ dt (32)
~~
If the expression in ey.(32) is positive, it is optimal not to impose a currency control in
an attempt to prevent domestic agents to hold foreign money balances. In the opposite
catic whcn il iti nc~;itivc il is uhlinril froni a social wclfarc pcrspcctivc tlta[ thc monetary
authorities do not allow domestic agents to hold foreign money. By its decision to impose
or not to impose a currency control and by efficient interest rate targeting, the monetary
authorities in a way correct for the unintended externalities because of inefficient net
seignorage tlows hctwcen thc huntc counUy and thc rest-of-the-world, when domes[ic
agents are not corrected. In the next empirical sectiun, the expression in eq.(32) is
evaluated empirically in the case of Poland which removed currency controls in January
1990. In appendix A the general form of social welfare -without interest rates necessarily
being set optimally- is shown in the case where no currency controls are present and in
the case where currency controls are present. Also the social welfare change from a
removal of currency controls is calculated. These additional excercises were motivated by
our doubts of the capability and willingness of Polish monetary authorities to set efficient
interest rates.
~ 4. Etnpirical investigntion qf currency suhstitution and currency contro[s : the Polish
experience of 1990.
'I'hc rcntoval of pricc ccilings tu`;cthcr with thc inunctary uvcrhang induced a
hyperintlation in Poland in the second half of 1989, as illustrated in figure 1 before.
Consequently, the democratically elected government Mazowiecki embarked upon a
comprehensive disintlation program which entailed a fixing of the Zloty against the
dollar, a reduction in the fiscal deficit, a restrictive income policy and the removal of
currency contruls. The removal of currency controls in Poland was achieved in 2 discrete
steps : in March 1989 foreign exchange restrictions were weakened considerably for
Polish households and in January 1990 the remainder of the system of currency controls
was removed.
tKIt is difficult to assess which step had the largest impact on currency substitution since
data on foreign exchange holdings, to ow~ knowledge, were not recorded. Since both dates
do not lie far from each other assuming that January 1990 was the date of removal of
Poli.tih currcncy cunlruls, duc.ti n~~l .ticc~n I~i iniply a lart;c incxactitude. "T'he wurkings and
the removal ol~ Polish currency controls ot course will not correspond exactly to the way
proposed in the theoretical section where it was assumed that currency controls are
effective in avoiding currency substitution to happen. It is likely that Polish agents already
possessed a certain amount oF foreign exchange, even while not officially allowed to do
su : this would ainuunt tu 'Icaky' currency cuntruls, upon which we touched befure.
Apart from the lack of data on US dollar'j holdings of Polish agents and on Zlotys'
circulating abroad -n, and m,' in the model- other difficulties with translating of the
theoretical model to the Polish experience result from the lack of a market interest rate
and conseyuently large swings in ex-post rcal interest rates, the doubtfullness of the
constant real output and government expenditures assumption and the assumption of
relative purchasing power parity -Poland maintained a relative uncompetitive exchange
rate in the attempt to fight inflation-.
Given these drawbacks, we consider it nevertheless to be interesting to investigate the
Polish case as an empirical application of our theoretical analysis. Our dataset
encompasses data on the Polish money supply, M1, the Polish consumer price index, P,
the olTicial Polish 3-ntontlt dcposit rate, i,~', and a US ~ 3-month deposit rate, i,"`. Data
were available from the International Financial Statistics, an unbroken time series for all
variables from July 1985 till December 1991 could be derived. In order to estimate the
structural parameters in the money demand functions -eqs.(16)(17) and (19)- of the
theoretical model, we make use of the fact that M1IP is the sum of real holdings of
domestic money hy domestic agents, m„ and foreign agents, m,'. This allows us to
estimate most structural parameters, despite the fact that me do not have any data on m„
~~ 1)M I iJ~~l~- riuirniy ~ul,~lilnlii~n wati invc.tilit~.alcd in Ihc x:uuc nianncr as Ilti diillar
I zloty currency substitution. Empirical results were, however, considerably less
convincing in the DM case and therefore not added to this section. If anything, DMs'
appear to be rather a complement of the Zloty than a substitute.
19n, and m,` themselves.
One important empirical implication from the theoretical part was the structural change in
demand for real Pulish nioney : a declinc in the intercept and an increase in the domestic
- and foreign interest rate elasticity. A simple plot of real money balances in figure 2
indeed suggests a structural break money demand at the end of 1989:
Fig.2 Real money balances in circulation.
We c,m Icst ~hiti thaire~ical iniplica~iim by splittint! the entire sample into two parts : one
covers the period July 1985 till Uecemher 1989 when currency controls were in force and
the second covers the period January 1990 till December 1991 when currency controls
were not active, and test whether intercept and slopes of the money demand function
changes.
In order to test for a structural hreak in the demand for money, we estimate a piecewise
linear regression that combines in one functional form eqs.(16), (19) and (27) :
In(Ml~` - Ro}D~.S~ t (3~.iiPtD~.S2.iiotD~.S3.i~~tEi
P
(33)
The dummy coefficients S,, S, and S, measure the 'regime switching' effects of a removal
of currency controls on money demand. The dummy D, takes a value 0 for the first
~usubsample and a value 1 for the second subsample. If S, is negative, support for the
prediction of a drop in the constant of the money demand funetion is found, while a
positive valuc for S, and a ncgative fi, support thc prediction about the changes in the
domestic - and foreign interest rate sensitivity of money demand.
The results from estimating eq.(33) are given in the second row of table 1. The estimates
for thc dumniy coclficicnl niorc or Icsti support lhc hypolhcscs : thc cstimatcs of S, and
S, have the correct sign, SZ has a wrong sign but is not significant at a confidence level of
90q . A substantial and statistically significant drop in the constant results, according to
the estimate of S,. The hypothesis that no structural break was present in Polish money
demand, i.e. that all S,-Sz-S,-O, can be rejected at a 95~ level of confidence.
An alternative way to test the predicted changes consists of estimating for both subsam-
ples the following generalised money demand function :
m~ - pa t(3 ~ . i~P t (32 . i~~t e~ (34)
A Chow-test can be carried out to test for the occurence of a structural change in ey.(34)
with the removal of the currency controL The estimated money demand function for the
first subsamplc is given in the third row of table l, the results for [he second subsample
are found in the fourth row, while the results for the entire sample are collected in the
fifth row. The F-value for the Chow-test on constancy of the regression coefficients
across both subsamples equals 3.51 which is higher than the critical value of 2.76 at a
95a1 confidence level and 3 and 72 degrees of freedom. Therefore, the hypothesis of no
structural chanf!e in the interecpt and thc slopes of the money demand function must be
rejected.
,iM1~P (aty) ó, ~31 ó~ S; a. w a ~ RZ S.E. DW
(33) 7.60 -.99 -1.01 .10 9.25 - - - - 0.86 0.11 2.01
(60.16) (-2.24) (-1.52) (1.46) (1.46)
(34a1 7.48 - -.48 - - -.49 - - - 0.79 0.09 1.92
(16.33) (-.76) (-.09)
(34b~ 6.80 - -.13 - - 6.86 - - - 0.46 0.14 1.97
(32.11) (-3.66) (1.96)
(34c1 7.18 - -.13 - - 3.04 - - - 0.85 0.11 2.04
(20.29) (-.8~) (.62)
(35) 7.21 - - - - - .72 .78 - 0.72 0.03 -
[.04] [.14] [.21]
(37) .58 -.31 -.32 -.11 4.38 - - - .93 0.88 0.10 1.81
(1.07) (-2.75) (-1.93) (.66) (2.77) (13.11)
Table 1. Estimation results of Polish money demand.
t-statistics in parantheses O, standard error of estimate in brackets[ ].
22The parameters {cxfry,W,a} can he estimated hy using nonlinear regression techniques :
eys.(16) and (27), namely, can be combined to the following piecewise nonlinear money
demand function:
ln(Ml) -(a~Y)} 1.w.(1-D)- I.ip.(1-D)- (a}1) iPD t 1 i~D P r 6 t 1 r Q~ 1 ~ r a(a t2) . t. r a(a ~2)' r~ r
(35)
The estimation results from eq.(35) are found in the sixth row of table 1.
"fhcsc csliniatcs of thc slruclural paramclcrs {u,W,rxf~y} uf lhc modcl ntakc it possihlc tu
evaluate the welfare changes from the removal of a currency control, according to the
model at least. The Polish interest rate in December 1989 was equal to 21 qr, , while the
US interest rate was equal to 8,390~ . Filling in values of {0.0839, 0.7212, 0.7784} for
{i,', w,rr} in eq.(32) gives a relation between a and U,"` - U,". The relation that is found
for this set of parameters is the following parabola in a:
U,"` Ur" - f i0.221 t0.327.a`I.e-8~`dt ~ 0.221 t0.327.a2
S r~
(36)
The shape of the a-parabola depends -for given values of w and i,'- on the value of a. If
we take a value of 0.5 for rJ instead of 0.78, the parabola becomes strictly decreasing in
a. Figure 3 graphs ey.(36) for these different values of rl:
?3Social welfarc chanp,e fnim removing currency controls
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Fig. 3 Social welfare change as a function of a and m.
a is the modelparameter that we cannot estimate from eq.(35) : we can estimate the sum
of (cx-t-ry) but not how this sum is divided, due to the lack of data on m,'. There is,
however, a possibility to infer an estimate of cx from eq.(29) of our model indirectly : if
we fill in values of i, of 21 oI and Q of 0.7784, a amounts to 0.12, a fairly small number
which is not counterintuitive since Polish Zloty are probably, even after restoration of
convertibility, of limited use to residents of other countries. A value of 0.12 for a,
implies a value of 7.09 of ry, given our estimate of (afry) of 7.21.
If we set a to 0.12 an instant increase in social welfare, according to eq.(36), of 0.226
results from thc removal of the former currency controls. The present value of this instant
social welfare change, i.e. the integral, can be approximated by dividing the instant social
welfare change by the pure rate of time preference, if {i,',Q,ca,a} remain approximately
constant over time. According to the model, therefore, the removal of the eurrency
controls in Poland in January 1990 has been efficient from a social welfare perspective.
In Appendix A the mudel solution in the case when interest rates are not necessarily
efficiently targeted, is derived as eq.(32)'. This exercise was undertaken because of our
doubts whether Polish monetary authorities actually were concerned or able to set interest
rates efficiently, according to eqs.(23) and (29). If we fill in the parameter estimates and
2~the actual interest rates, the estimated social welfare change from the removal of currency
controls rises to 0.756. This result at the same time confirms our doubts about the
efficiency of intcrest rate targeting and uur finding that the removal of currency controls
has been efficient from a social welfare perspective.
It is possible of course that a,~y,a and w did not remain constant over the whole sample,
an assumption that underlies the estimation of ey.(35). A possibility that was not consi-
dered explicitly in the theoretical analysis but which has strong intuitive appeal : the
rcmoval ol currcncy contrulti and thc rcfunn pr~~ccss in thc t'olish cconumy arc likely to
have stimulated the substituability of Polish Zloty's and foreign currency. It is also likely
that the hyperinflation itself induces changes in a and perhaps also in {a,y,w}. In
particular a form of hysteresis in velocity could be induced that was not uncommon in
Latin America after hyperinflations : even after a hyperinflation, domestic agents held a
permanently higher level of US ~ and a permanently lower level of domestic money. The
high degree of dollarization of the economy became a structural element. Agents are
likely to react in this manner in our model if a decreases andlor w increases structurally.
Clements 8t Schwartz [1993] find evidence for such a form of inertia in the demand for
domestic money in the case of Bolivia, where after the hyperintlation of 1985,
dollarization remained at a structurally higher level.
We replicate the analysis of Clements óc Schwartz in the case of Poland by estimating a
variant of ey.(33) that incorporates this hystcresis in currency substitution by means of
inserting the lagged dependent variahle as an explanatory variable:
ln( p1)~ - (ia t D~. S t(3~.i,vtDl.S..i~VtD~.S3.i~`~}~l.ln( pl)~-i}Er (37)
The estimatíon results, as summarized in thc last row of table I, support the hypothesis of
hysteresis in Polish currency substitution : a sigificant adjustment coefficient ~ of the
stock variable, real domestic money in circulation, is found. A coefficient of .93 implies
that only 7q~ of the adjustment between desired and current real money balances occured
instantaneously, that is in the current month. This form of hysteresis is likely to appear in
situations where individuals douht the duration of monetary stability after a hyperinflation
?Sand therefore continue to demand foreign money balances from a precautionary motive.
~5. Conclusinns
In the context of a small open economy model, a closer look at the social welfare
consequences of currency suhstitution and currency controls was undertaken. Currency
substítution of a significant degree was seen to have potentially strong influence on public
finance and, conseyuently, social welfare. Currency substitution imposes intlationary
discipline to monetary policymakers, because a higher degree of currency substitution
makes demand for domestic money, and by that real seignorage revenues, more sensitive
to inflation differentials hetwcen the small economy and the rest-of-the-world. Net seigno-
rage flows because of currency substitution are likely to be negative for a small country
since it is likely not to have the vehicle currency function that the foreign money
possesses.
Much emphasis was put on the social welfare effects of imposing and removing of
currency conu~ulti. Currency cemU~uls are a widespread phenontenon in developing
countries and in the model they enter as device with which monetary authorities are able
to avoid currency substitution and hy that prevent the seignorage outflow due to currency
wbstitution in the dontestic econonry. "fhc removal of a currency control was seen to
induce a structural break in money demand. An expression was derived in order to
determine when removing a currency control is optimal according to the model.
An empirical illusn~xtion uf thc analysis was carricd with respect to US dollar currency
substitution in Poland, where the removal of a currency control on Ith January 1990 was
part of a larger reform package and an active disinflation policy. The empirical results
where not unfavourahle to somc theoretical hypotheses : evidence for a significant
structural hreak in money demand was found. Empirical evaluation of the model allowed
us to conclude cautiously that the removal of the system of currency controls in Poland
was cllicicnl Iruiu ;i social wcll;u~c pcrshcc~ivc. 1'olish currency substitutiutt displaycd a
26form of hysteresis : af-ter the hyperintlation a structurally higher degree of dollarization
was sccn, which iinly ~tir.~duall~ dcclinal .rltcr lhc hyperintlation.
Appendix A
In gencral, il intcresl ratcs arc nut scl ncccssarily cqual to thc optimal level of ey.(23),
by filling in eq.(22) widi the correct functions, a general social welfare funetion results :
Ul - ~{y~-g~ til.a ~ il~.co ~~~~ 1~).i,` ~
2a(a ~2).i~ ` }.e-a.r dr (24),
lo
Eq.(24)' could be compared with eq.(24) such as to assess how inefficient current
monetary policies are as compared to the optimum of eq.(24). The general form of the
social welfare function in the presence of a currency control, so if interest rates are not
necessarily set according to ey.(29), can be written as :
Ulcc -r{yl-gl~lt.OC-(2atl).w2- I .i~ },e-a.rdt (31),
J 2(a t I) 2(a } 1) ra
If the general expression for social welfare with currency controls, eq.(31)', is subtracted
Irom sucial wclfare wilhuul currency cuntrols, cy.(24)', we get the general net gain or
loss when removing a currency control:
U,nr
t~~ J i l~ . W
~o
I i~ a~ I . z 2a ~ I zl a'dt
a(O t2)(a' I) I
-- l ~ --- -- -- -. . W . C '
?a(a t2)' ` 2a(a t 1) (32),
where it has been assumed that the domestic interest is not changed by the myopic social
planner, when a currency control is removed or imposed at time t. The negative first term
in eq.(32)' is a net seignoragc transfer ahroad when removing currency controls, the
second and third terms ~u-e 'interest ratc' ellccts on social welfare from removal of
currrency controts at time t and the last tenn is the increase in social welfare from the
higher monetary utility when heing allowed to hold foreign currency. Myopic monetary
policies typically only would take into account the seignorage effect when motivating the
use of currency controls. More eftïcient monetary policymaking would also take account
,~ol thc olhcr thrcc cllccls ~~I' rcinovimti a cw~rcncy control. Whcn Ihc cxpression in ey.(32).
is positive a removal iil~ cw-rency contruls is efficient, even if the domestic interest rate is
not necessarily being set optimal.
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